Being Dalit is Also Important in poll bound Uttar Pradesh
Being Dalit is Also Important in poll bound Uttar Pradesh
Being Dalit is Also Important in poll bound Uttar Pradesh
Dr. Manzoor Ali
Shridhran (2014) argued that the pro-Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) swing in 16th Lok Sabha election is not due to anti-minority polarization but dissatisfaction with UPA’s economic policy. However, aftermath of 2014 general election, few political commentators, especially from right-wing, claimed the arrival of a new dawn of post-minority politics in India. The consolidation of majority of castes and class in favour of BJP was termed as consequence of Hindu awakening.
In post-minority politics, BJP claimed that it does not required Muslims’ vote.
Some enthusiast even put forward the idea to take away Muslims’ right to vote.
However, poll bound Uttar Pradesh suddenly turned the tide in favour of Muslims.
Major political parties such as Samajwadi Party (SP), Indian National Congress (INC), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) including BJP and others, have started wooing 19.3 percent of state’s population.
BJP is trying to encash Muslims’ resentment against SP in its favour.
Thus, it has started projecting the contest between SP and BJP. BSP and SP too are designing strategies to get majority of Muslim votes.
For instance, Bhaichara sammelan has been organizing by BSP in Muslim localities. However, there is another constituency, Dalit, of voters, which has not been much discussed yet.
Perhaps, it reflects the overconfidence among the political parties vis-à-vis Dalit voters.
BSP thinks that the recent attacks on Dalits in Gujarat and other places shall galvanized majority of their votes in its pocket. BSP supremo Mayawati is also relying on her core Jatav/Chamar caste votes.
This particular caste, loyal supporters of BSP, consists of 11.5 percent of total population of Uttar Pradesh. Within Scheduled Caste (SC), their share is 54.3 percent.
On the other hand, BJP has been trying to mobilise the non-Jatav Dalits in its favour.
The major beneficiary of state resources has been Chamar/Jatav. This has been used by BJP as propaganda to make inroad among non-jatav Dalits.
The induction of R.K. Chaudhary, former BSP and a Pasi leader, into BJP government is part of that strategy.
BJP has inducted Boddh Bhikshuk to campaign among Dalits and neo-Buddhist in all the 403 constituencies.
Similarly, BJP is working on other castes.
Now, let us observe what these strategies have yielded for these political parties.
The Dhamma Chetna Yatra was termed as Gumrah Chetna Yatra by BSP. The meeting failed miserably as the campaign was able to attract fewer Dalits.
And, Amit Shah cancelled his address two days prior to this meeting. Similarly, Swabhiman rally organized by former BSP leader Swami Prasad Maurya was a failure.
Maurya’s parivartan rally in Pratapgarh, his home town, was also failed to attract masses.
Sanjay Kumar, CSDS, argued that leaders may change their party loyalty but couldn’t carry over the voters. Rohitha Vemula case, Una atrocity, rapes of Dalit women and other such atrocities have shaken the trust that RSS is forging into the caste groups.
Nonetheless, the BJP’s loss is not BSP’s gain.
There are complexity involved in Dalit and BSP relationship. The non-Jatav Dalits too have gain political consciousness and the process has made them recognize the development deficit as compare to Jatav/Chamar. They knew their strength and its benefit in democracy.
In the competitive electoral politics, political parties vie to gain the majority and thus the scope for alliance with smaller caste groups become important. Once, it was done by Congress party, now BJP emulate.
In fact, regional party like Samajwadi Party too extend its alliance with smaller caste groups.
Thus, scope for electoral alliance is quite overt without change in permanent social base of each party. It means Jatav, Yadav and upper castes still act as social base of BSP, SP and BJP respectively. But, it is also true that there has been appearance of erosion in that core social base.
We have examples of Jatav voting for SP, Yadav voting for BJP and Brahmins voting for both SP and BSP. Thus, there has been reduction in share and increased mobility in social base of parties.
Thus, Mayawati cannot guarantee the consolidation of Dalits under her aegis.
Support of BAMCEF is another important factor that has to be considering, in reference with Dalits voters in Uttar Pradesh. In 2012 election, BSP has lost 24 percent of Jatav/Chamar vote base and Samajwadi Party won in many of the reserve constituencies.
Although there was no formal announcement, on December 2012 BAMCEF split into two parts.
The breakaway group formed Bahujan Mukti Party (BMP) with aim to fight against Brahmanism. Their main allegation against BSP was that it is not implementing the ideas of Baba Sahib Ambedkar.
BMP has strong cadre support at the grass root in Uttar Pradesh, which can be decisive in close contest against BSP.
The grapevine in power corridor is that BMP have decided to vote in favour of SP. The argument is that only the defeat of BSP will provide necessary space to BMP in Dalit politics.
Hence, due to erosion in core support base, it is imperative for BSP, first, to win them back and then look to forge alliance with other class and caste groups. Also, idea of Dalit-Muslim (DM) unity should and must move beyond practicality and immediate need satisfaction. To have long term social alliance based on marginalized identity; these two groups have to sort out many debatable issues.
